The year 2008 was marked by two important moments on the jurisdiction of copyright.
On May 21, 2008, the Social Chamber of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the jurisdiction without exception of the Industrial Tribunal for disputes arising in connection with the contract labor, enacted by article L511- 1 of the Labour Code (now L1411-1).
As a result, she asked that the Industrial Tribunal retains jurisdiction even in cases of disputes relating to intellectual property rights, since the dispute arises in connection with the employment contract.
The scope of this ruling is broad since referred the many challenges arising from Article L. 111.1 of the Code of Intellectual Property (ICC), which provides that the existence of an employment contract does not imply any derogation from the enjoyment of the rights of the author.
Thus, all the protective rules of Article L131-3 of the ICC will apply. Thus, in the employment contract, each of the rights of the author must be indicated separately, so that the field of exploitation of the rights granted "being defined as to its scope and purpose, as to place and how long. " Failing that statement, the employer is liable to damages.
In practice, jurisprudence remains insecure and difficult to read because some decisions recognize the implicit assignment of the rights of the author's employer. The role of the court's discretion and is therefore decisive.
Thus, when the Court of Cassation affirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal for this type of litigation, it exposes the party to decisions that might be tainted with a particular uncertainty. This will be especially important that intellectual property is often considered a domain reserved for specialists in this field.
In short, the decision of May 21, 2008 just to oppose an elitist intellectual property rights, which intends to escape its dispute to a court insufficiently specialized.
The law of 4 August 2008, however, has upset the deal.
Indeed, it amends Article L331-1 of the ICC, by providing that all disputes relating to the implementation of provisions under Copyright and courts of the judiciary are "exclusively in the courts of first instance."
The legislators clearly here his preference for a greater specialization of courts since the intellectual property rights are at stake
This orientation can be criticized. Especially because often disputes about these rights find their solutions in the common law, such as that of the fault. Nevertheless it seems against the grain of the decision of the Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation.
In this context, the year 2009 can and should provide desirable clarification.